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Between 1660 and 1830, Parliament passed thousands of acts restructuring rights to real and equitable
estates. These estate acts enabled individuals and families to sell, mortgage, lease, exchange, and improve
land previously bound by inheritance rules and other legal legacies. The loosening of these legal constraints
facilitated the reallocation of land and resources towards higher-value uses. Data reveals correlations
between estate acts, urbanization, and economic development during the decades surrounding the Industrial
Revolution.
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The interrelationship between the economic system and the legal system are 
extremely complex, and many of the effects of changes in the law on the working 
of the economic system … are still hidden from us (Ronald Coase 1988 p. 31). 
 
… having too many sticks in the bundle of rights that is property increases the 





Between 1660 and 1830, Britain’s Parliament passed roughly 3,500 acts altering 
individuals’ and families’ rights to real and equitable estates, principally rights to land and 
permanent fixtures, such as buildings and mines, upon the land. The volume of these acts, which 
we refer to as estate acts, exceeded the volume of all other legislation, with the exception of acts 
establishing statutory authorities and enclosure commissions. Concerning the latter, a large 
literature exists. Few scholars, however, have studied estate acts. As a result, fundamental 
questions remain unanswered. What was the economic rationale underlying estate legislation? 
What were estate acts’ economic effects?  
This essay answers these questions by analyzing several sources seldom studied by 
economic historians. The first is a database containing all estate acts passed by Parliament 
between 1660 and 1830, constructed by the authors.
1 The second is a series of parliamentary 
reports including the First Report of His Majesty’s Commissioners Respecting Real Property and 
the Report from the Select Committee on House of Commons Officers and Fees.
2 The third is the 
Journals of the House of Commons.
3 The fourth is the Middlesex Deeds Registry.
4  These 
sources reveal rationales for estate legislation. 
                                                 
1   For detailed descriptions and data series, see Bogart and Richardson (2008b). 
2   The First Report of the Royal Commission on Real Property was published in the British Parliamentary Papers, 
1829, Vol. X. Hereafter, we cite this reference as BPP 1829.  The Report from the Select Committee on House of 
Commons Officers and Fees was published in the British Parliamentary Papers, 1833, Vol. XII. Hereafter, we 
cite this reference as BPP 1833.   
3   The Journals of the House of Commons may now be found at the web site British History Online. The URL is 
http://www.british-history.ac.uk.   2
Estate acts were necessary because the inheritance system – known as strict settlements – 
created equitable estates in land (enforced by the court of Chancery) on top of real estates in land 
(enforced by common law courts). These overlapping estates involved numerous individuals, 
including the landholder, his extended family, additional beneficiaries designated by past 
landholders, and all potential heirs (including those unborn). All of these individuals possessed 
rights to revenues derived from the land. These complicated bundles of overlapping rights 
prevented property holders from using resources as they saw fit. Landholders could neither 
mortgage, nor lease, nor sell much of the land under their control. Landholders had to dedicate 
large tracts of land to traditional tasks. Landlords could not cut timber or mine coal unless 
explicitly authorized to do so. Landholders could neither utilize resources in new ways nor 
improve infrastructure without reaching agreements with all other parties possessing interests in 
a parcel, and such agreements could not, in most cases, be enforced by law, but could, in many 
instances, be challenged through courts. Conveying land to new parties proved particularly 
problematic. The Chancery Court emphasized the security of beneficial interests (even minor and 
tangential) rather than the rights of purchasers (however deserving and efficiency enhancing). 
This inflexible system posed problems for people trying to exploit opportunities arising from 
technologies unanticipated in decades past. 
Estate acts loosened these constraints by permitting previously prohibited actions, 
reorganizing complicated bundles of rights, and conveying those new rights to new users. Estate 
acts began as petitions from landholders seeking relief from restrictions that strict settlements 
imposed on the employment of land and resources. Parliament reviewed these petitions, ensured 
that they met certain standards for protecting the rights of all interested parties, and then passed 
                                                                                                                                                             
4   The Middlesex Deeds registry is available in the London Metropolitan Archive.  See Sheppard, Belcher, and 
Cottrell (1979) for details and summary statistics on this source.   3
legislation establishing new rules regarding the employment and conveyance of property. Most 
estate acts authorized the sale, lease, or improvement of land. In layman’s language, estate acts 
freed land from the shackles of the past and exposed land to the invisible hand. In economic 
terms, estate acts reduced transaction costs and enabled landholders to undertake activities that 
they could not take given existing property-rights arrangements and legal institutions. 
It should be expected that reducing transaction costs facilitated the reallocation of 
resources to new and superior uses. Case studies and quantitative evidence indicate that this was 
the case. Concentrations of estate acts occurred in urbanizing areas, such as the periphery of 
London, and in industrializing regions, such as the county of Lancaster. Correlations between 
estate legislation, urbanization, and industrialization suggest a link between the reorganization of 
property rights and Britain’s march towards modernity. 
A companion paper (Bogart and Richardson 2008b) illuminates quantitative 
characteristics of estate legislation. It demonstrates, for example, that landholders from all walks 
of life employed estate acts to alter rights to land that they possessed. The preponderance of the 
land affected by estate acts lay in England. A minority lay in Scotland, Wales, and Ireland. A 
small fraction lay in colonies overseas. An appendix contains a series of tables presenting an 
array of information, including chronological and cross-sectional data series, with which scholars 
can test our hypotheses or advance their own.  
Another companion paper advances a broader argument (Bogart and Richardson 2008a). 
At the end of the seventeenth century, Parliament established multiple forums where rights to 
land and resources could be reorganized. These forums served individuals, families, and 
communities by issuing estate, enclosure, and statutory authority acts. These forums enabled 
property rights to adapt to changing economic conditions. The paper employs historical   4
evidence, archival data, and statistical analysis to demonstrate that between 1700 and 1830, 
Parliament passed an increasing number of acts reorganizing property rights in response to 
increases in the demand for such acts. Tests with placebo groups confirm the robustness of this 
result. 
Together, these essays lay the foundation for our broader hypothesis. Institutional 
adaptability facilitated Britain’s transition from a medieval to a modern property-rights system. 
Britain was the first nation to make this transition and the only European empire to make the 
transition gradually and peacefully. The transition occurred in the decades following the 
Glorious Revolution and may be one reason that the Industrial Revolution began in Britain. Our 
emphasis differs from Douglas North and Barry Weingast (1989), who argue that following the 
Glorious Revolution, security against sovereign expropriation fostered the growth of capital 
markets. Scholars – including Gregory Clark and Patrick O’Brien (1994) – dispute the accuracy 
of that assertion. We emphasize that Parliament’s actions lowered transaction costs, increased the 
security of conveyance, and restructured property rights in ways that enhanced efficiency. 
The argument that we advance in this series of papers addresses issues of broad academic 
interest. Social scientists often note that developed and developing nations differ in the nature of 
their property rights’ regimes. Hernando de Soto (2000) observes, for example, that in 
developing nations, inflexible and opaque rules regarding property prevent citizens from 
converting assets, which they hold in abundance, into capital, the medium of the modern market 
economy. Ronald Coase (1960, 1974) observes that attaining economic efficiency in the 
presence of transaction costs requires the proper definition and allocation of rights. Common and 
statutory law recognized this principle in nineteenth-century Britain, Coase argues, and by 
assigning property rights to maximize productivity, fostered British economic ascendance.   5
Richard Posner (2003) emphasizes a related issue. According to Posner, common-law legal 
systems foster economic efficiency because judicial decisions “allocate responsibilities between 
people engaged in interacting activities in such a way as to maximize the joint value, or, what 
amounts to the same thing, minimize the joint cost of the activities (Posner 2003 p. 98).” Like 
Coase, Posner corroborates his claim with historical examples.  
This essay adds new observations to the historical corpus. In the eighteenth century, 
when the British economy entered an unparalleled era of expansion, Britain’s Parliament began 
operating according to Coasian principles and reorganized property rights en masse. In the 
nineteenth century, when most common-law doctrines reached their modern form, doctrines of 
equity (enforced through the Chancery Court) dominated the conveyance of land. These 
doctrines were designed to protect beneficial interests, not to maximize productivity. Efficiency 
became a dominant doctrine in the English legal system only after Parliamentary intervention. 
The rest of this essay advances our argument. Section 2 provides historical background, 
principally by describing the system of strict settlements and English law governing equitable 
and real estates.  Section 3 sketches our economic interpretation of the equitable and real 
property, principally by elucidating how the system of strict settlements contributed to high (and 
often prohibitive) transaction costs and the insecurity of conveyance. Section 4 contains case 
studies that illuminate real-world problems posed by the system of strict settlements. Section 5 
discusses how estate acts solved these problems, lowered transaction costs, and facilitated the 
reallocation of resources. Section 6 reveals correlations between the number of estate acts in 
each county and the rate of urbanization. Section 7 discusses the implications of our analysis. It 
focuses on broad issues, such as how the development of Britain’s property-rights system 
fostered economic development.    6
 
2. Strict Settlements 
Estate acts arose from an English system of inheritance that solidified around the Civil 
War of the 1640s and prevailed for several centuries thereafter. During this era, large landowners 
held most of their land under settlement. Lesser gentry and yeoman families also employed the 
legal device, even on single family farms. While estimates vary, at the peak, at least one-quarter 
and as much as three-fourths of land in England was strictly settled.
5  
A settlement served several principal purposes. The first was to keep a family’s estate 
together for future generations. A settlement dictated that the estate descend intact from one 
generation to the next. It did this by assigning control of the estate to a single heir, usually the 
eldest son of the current holder. A second purpose was to care for the extended family. A 
settlement did this by assigning stipends to relatives such as children, grandchildren, widows, 
cousins, uncles, aunts, nephews, and nieces. Some individuals received periodic payments, such 
as monthly or annual stipends. Other individuals received lump sums, often upon marriage or 
reaching the age of adulthood. 
A settlement was a generic name for a property transaction and for the documents created 
in its consummation. Settlement deeds contained six common elements. The premises listed the 
names, occupations, and ranks of the parties involved, including the trustees. The recitals and 
testatum described the property to be settled and the purpose of the settlement. The habendum 
contained the trusts imposed upon the property, such as jointures (payments to widows) and 
portions (payments to younger children). The entails set out the order of succession, established 
life-estates for living heirs, and established a series of fee tail estates for unborn heirs. The 
                                                 
5   Some of the best known works describing the system of strict settlements are Thompson (1963, 1994), Eileen 
(1964, 1983, 1993), Baker (1971) English and Saville (1983), Beckett (1984), Habakkuk (1994), and Cannadine 
(1994).    7
powers described what the life tenants and trustees could do with the estate (English and Saville, 
1983, pp. 19-21). 
Many features of settlements influenced the use and allocation of property. The holder of 
settled land was not the absolute owner. The holder was merely a life tenant of an estate. The 
land belonged to a trust, for which the holder was named the beneficiary. The holder, in turn, 
held the land in trust for other beneficiaries, typically including his wife, children, unborn 
descendants, all potential future heirs, and members of his extended family, such as his brothers, 
sisters, nieces, nephews, and other descendants of previous holders of the estate. The life tenant 
controlled the use of the land possessed by the nested trusts as long as the life tenant fulfilled the 
terms of his stewardship. This legal structure – a trust within a trust – kept settlements from 
being adjudicated in common law courts. The common law did not recognize such legal 
structures. Only the Chancery court recognized and enforced such arrangements.  
Settlements restricted the uses to which resources could be put. The holder of a settled 
estate (who was just a life tenant) could not grant leases lasting beyond his life and could not 
grant leases from which he benefited at the expense of his successors (such as leases in which 
tenants paid lump sums up front in return for concessions). The holder of a settled estate could 
not sell, exchange, or mortgage the property. If he completed such transactions, he could be held 
liable for damages to the estate, and the transaction could be voided, because he had no power to 
transfer title. Similarly, the holder of an estate could not alter the property, even if he considered 
the alterations to be an improvement. The removal of trees, hedges, and buildings, the opening of 
new mines, quarries, and peat bogs, and the conversion of arable lands into pasture (or vice 
versa) could be considered waste. All those who benefited from such actions could be liable for 
damages, if upon inheriting an estate, the successor claimed to have been harmed by the acts.   8
Sales, exchanges, mortgages, improvements, and long-term leases could only be undertaken if 
the powers section of a settlement contained specific clauses authorizing such actions. 
Settlements written in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries seldom provided such powers. 
By the nineteenth century, settlements became increasingly sophisticated, and tended to provide 
broader powers to estate holders. 
A settlement legally bound the hands of all heirs alive when it was written. A settlement 
could not be changed until a tenant in tail (i.e. the next in line to inherit) who was born after the 
date of settlement came of age (i.e. reached age 21). Then, the current life tenant (usually the 
father) and the future tenant in tail (usually the son) could remove the entail by the legal process 
of common recovery. This procedure involved a collusive lawsuit concerning a fictitious 
transaction backed by a warranty to recover land of equal value in fee simple should the 
warrantor default.
6 This legal trick would have enabled the life tenant alone to break the entail in 
the absence of the strict settlement, which lawyers devised to block common recovery, by 
creating an equitable estate protected by the Chancery courts, which life tenants could not break. 
Whenever possible, families resettled estates when the heir apparent reached the age of 
majority and/or when the heir apparent married. Resettlements at age of majority protected the 
interests of the extended family, who would lose their legal claim to financial support if an heir 
born after the date of settlement (and therefore unbound by the settlements’ provisions and 
entail) inherited the estate. Resettlement at time of marriage protected the interests of the wife, 
who needed means of support should she outlive her husband; the wife’s children, who needed to 
be placed first-in line for succession; and the in-laws, who usually contributed land to the estate, 
and who in certain circumstances, might regain that land or enter the line of succession. 
                                                 
6 See Baker (1971) for a detailed discussion of common recovery.   9
These facts ensured that families kept their land settled at almost all times and that 
settlements could be changed only infrequently, at intervals of two or more decades, as a family 
waited for an heir to come of age and for the father and son to reach an agreement about 
restructuring the estate. The time to resettlement could be greatly lengthened if the life tenant 
died without a surviving son and the estate passed to a male relative who was a child when the 
settlement was written. The entail would bind such an heir until he bore a son who reached the 
age of twenty one. 
Settlements restricted powers for several reasons. Restrictions prevented the holder of the 
estate from dissipating resources dedicated to the support of future heirs and the extended family. 
Another reason was powers’ uncertain effects on the legal stability of the settlement. In the late 
seventeenth century, settlements were a novel legal form. Settlements with expansive powers had 
not been tested in the Chancery court. Chancery interpreted settlements conservatively and 
presumed that life tenants did not possess powers that were not explicitly described in 
documents. Landholders could not predict how the court would react to the inclusion of 
additional powers or whether the wording of a novel clause might provide a life tenant with a 
loophole enabling him to circumvent all other restrictions.  
Landholders also did not know the personality of the person(s) who would inherit their 
estates. Settlements were designed to last far into the future. Settlements dictated that if possible, 
the estate descend from first son to first son, but disease and demographics dictated that estates 
occasionally shifted from the direct paternal line, and cousins, minor children, or distant relatives 
might inherit. This person would have power over the widow, dependants, and descendants of 
the individual who established the settlement. Providing too much power to the life tenant of the   10
estate, particularly when the wording of clauses providing powers had not been tested in court, 
put the interests of other members of the family at risk. 
Uncertainty about the impact of providing powers to the life tenants and the threat that 
powers might pose to the interests of the extended family meant that landholders only included 
extensive and/or novel powers when doing so promised lucrative returns. In the seventeenth 
century, when the settlement system evolved, technology changed slowly. Economic progress 
proceeded at a slow pace. The problems posed by expansive powers probably outweighed the 
potential benefits, at least in the eyes of the wealthy families, which typically bound land in 
restrictive settlements. Most of those families felt that reorganizing resources once each 
generation, when the family resettled its estates, would ensure the family employed resources 
optimally. As the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries progressed, however, the pace of 
technological change accelerated and economic opportunities arose more often. Families needed 
new and flexible ways of managing estates. Simultaneously, courts and lawyers gained 
experience with particular clauses providing particular powers, and the risk of including these 
clauses in settlements declined. These circumstances meant that restrictive settlements became 
increasingly inefficient. 
Market transactions could not easily alleviate these inefficiencies because conducting 
transactions and enforcing contracts on settled land could be costly, uncertain, and insecure. 
Settlements were long, complex documents, traditionally unpunctuated, and full of repetition.
7 
Interpreting settlements required experience, skill, detailed knowledge of the document, and a 
large library of property laws, precedents, and legal texts estimated at 674 volumes in 1826 
(English and Saville, 1983, p. 18). Public libraries did not contain these volumes. The public also 
                                                 
7   The fact that until the Conveyancing Act of 1881, solicitors were paid for conveyances by the word (1s for every 
72 words in 1862), did not encourage conciseness (England and Saville, 1983, p. 18).    11
lacked access to information about Chancery courts proceedings and precedents, because the 
court did not keep detailed written records of its proceedings until the later seventeenth century. 
Settlements themselves were not part of the public record. Copies of the deeds were usually held 
by the life tenants, trustees, lawyers, and maybe members of the extended family. Settlements 
had to be consulted before taking out mortgages, drawing up leases, or completing sales, because 
if the settlement did not specifically authorize a transaction, the transaction could be voided. 
Ambiguities in settlements often deterred individuals from transacting on estates, for fear that the 
transactions would be disputed by other beneficiaries.  
Another source of confusion was settlements multilayered structures. Strict settlements 
established equitable estates, which created a trust within a trust and gave beneficiaries rights to 
income from a family’s real estates. Equitable estates were enforced in the Chancery court. A 
real estate was a set of rights to land and permanent fixtures, such as buildings and mines, upon 
the land. Real rights of many forms existed, the most common and consequential were feudal 
tenures. Tenures (and other rights to real property) were enforced in common law courts. 
The next section of this essay elaborates on the transaction costs created by the system of 
strict settlements. The discussion covers a wide range of issues in the laws governing equitable 
and real estates. The discussion explains how the overlapping equitable and real estates impeded 
the reallocation of resources and reduced the security of conveyancing (i.e. of transferring land 
among owners). 
 
3. Transaction Costs Created by Strict Settlements 
  The Coase Theorem revolves around a pivotal point. Transaction costs – particularly the 
expense, certainty, enforceability, and feasibility of contracting – determine property rights’ 
economic effects. Low transaction costs yield environments in which the assignment of rights   12
influences the distribution of wealth, but not the allocation of resources among competing tasks 
or the efficiency of market outcomes. High transaction costs yield environments in which the 
assignment of rights affects the allocation of resources, the efficiency of markets, and the 
distribution of income. The transaction costs associated with the system of strict settlements 
were, as this section shows, often high and occasionally prohibitive. 
  A settlement created an estate in equity with a plethora of participants. These included 
the life tenant, current dependents, and potential heirs. The life tenant made decisions concerning 
the management of the estate, subject to the terms of the settlement, which limited his powers, 
obligated him to carry out the wishes of his ancestors, compelled him to care for members of his 
extended family, and ensured that he did not take actions that prejudiced the interests of heirs to 
come. Dependents and heirs could defend their interests, if they believed them to be neglected or 
attacked, through the Chancery court and other judicial venues. 
The settlement was, in other words, an intergenerational bargain within an extended 
family. The costs of renegotiating the agreement rose with the size of the family, the diversity of 
its members (and their interests), the complexity of the settlement, and the intricacies of the 
bargain to be struck. Life tenants who wished to undertake actions beyond the bounds of their 
powers had to convince all parties of the settlement to concur. Otherwise, other parties to the 
settlement could hold up the transaction, by claiming that their interests were affected, and bring 
actions in various legal venues. 
Economic transactions between life tenants and third parties – such as purchasing 
property from, leasing land from, or mining coal on a settled estate – created additional 
complications. For simplicity, we refer to all potential third parties as ‘entrepreneurs.’ We begin 
by considering the case of an entrepreneur hoping to strike a deal with a life tenant who   13
possessed powers to sell, lease, and/or improve his land, and explain how settlements 
complicated transactions even with empowered owners. Later, we discuss the problems of 
transaction with owners lacking such powers. 
Deals between life tenants and entrepreneurs often foundered because of problems posed 
by settlements. One problem was lack of public information concerning the contents of 
settlements. Settlements were not public records. Copies of them existed in no public repository. 
Entrepreneurs could only get information about settlements from life tenants themselves or 
perhaps from other private parties with copies of the documents. Interpreting these documents 
might be difficult, because settlements represented intergenerational bargains among extended 
families. Implicit understandings of longstanding might influence families’ relations. Families 
might interpret and enforce their bargains internally. Differences might exist between the 
settlement as written and the bargain as implemented. If families resolved the issue amongst 
themselves, ambiguities might exist in the documents that had not been tested in court or 
reworked with lawyers. 
  Ambiguities in settlements were a common concern. Ambiguity existed in part because 
of uncertainty about how the Chancery would interpret the wording of documents disputed 
before them. Chancery began to adjudicate large numbers of settlements only in the eighteenth 
century. These early settlements were conservative, or strict, providing few powers to life 
tenants. Chancery developed experience dealing with these laconic compacts, but how Chancery 
would interpret novel wordings and powers remained uncertain. Solicitors and barristers 
lamented this fact even in the nineteenth century. 
  Another complication arose from the long and variable statutes of limitations concerning 
the conveyance of land. English law lacked a set length of time after which an individual who   14
purchased land honestly and enjoyed undisputed proprietorship was secure in his title. The length 
of time after which an individual knew he was secure against claims of adverse possession 
depended upon the method of conveyance via which they acquired the land, the type of tenure 
under which they held the land, the existence of settlements and entails, the existence of prior 
rights or conveyances, and the existence of writs or other legal remedies available to potential 
plaintiffs. For example, 
The time limitation in a writ of right is sixty years, that in a formedon, a writ in the nature 
of a writ of right, and one of the remedies to recover a mere right of property, is only 
twenty years; whilst in the possessory actions of mort d’ancestor and novel disseisin, fifty 
years is the limitation for writs founded on ancestor’s possession, and thirty years for 
writs founded on the claimant’s own possession (BPP 1829 p. 132). 
 
Many actions undertaken in the court of Chancery possessed no statute of limitations.  
These long, variable, and at times unlimited periods meant that entrepreneurs purchasing 
land from settled estates had to be concerned that their purchase could be disputed far into the 
future. Entrepreneurs had to fear “pocket conveyances” and “pocket settlements” which might 
appear decades in the future giving other parties the ability to dispute the entrepreneurs’ 
possession of the property. These fears were exacerbated by a legal principal that prevented 
trustees of land from providing receipt for payments for land that they sold. Only the beneficiary 
of the trust could provide proper receipt for payments. The life tenant of a settled estate was the 
beneficiary of a trust that held the land for his use, and thus, could provide receipt for his own 
interests, but the life tenant was also a trustee for the tenant in tail, all other potential heirs, and 
everyone in his extended family that received support via the settlement. The life tenant could 
not provide receipt for payments meant to buy out their interests. Thus, an entrepreneur wishing 
to purchase land from a settled estate had to have written receipts from all interested parties, no 
matter how remote, to ensure that they did not dispute the fact of his payment. If he did not   15
acquire written receipts from all interested parties, even those he did not know about, he could be 
forced to pay again. Even if he acquired receipts, he could also be forced to pay again if he 
delivered the payment to the trustees, rather than the beneficiaries, and the trustees took the 
money for themselves and denied it to their charges. 
In 1829, a leading barrister, J. J. Park, described this problem to a Parliamentary 
commission in these terms. 
The doctrine of seeing to the application of purchase money, in cases where there is a 
trust or authority to sell, appear to me to be one of the false steps of the English law. 
Every principle of common sense, of justice, and of convenience, dictates that the party 
who places a confidence in another respecting his property should be the sufferer, if that 
confidence should be misplaced, rather than an innocent person who has acted bona fide. 
If A. intrusts B. to sell his estate, and I buy it, and pay B. the money, which he embezzles, 
it is preposterous to say that A. can with justice require me to pay the price over again. 
He was the agent of A., not of me; I did not select him (BPP 1829 p. 169). 
 
Complaints about this problem of paying twice appear numerous times in the testimony collected 
by the Parliamentary commission and the literature on legal history. 
One reason for this rule regarding receipts was a precaution of courts in favor of parties 
beneficially interested. This precaution pervaded legal doctrines concerning trusts and estates, 
and particularly influenced the proceedings in Chancery, which was a court of equity where 
parties sought equitable relief and courts sought outcomes according to “equity and good 
conscience (Baker 1971 p. 129).” In 1829, when testifying before the Parliamentary commission 
concerning real property, John Bell esquire, the King’s Counsel, stated that “I think we have got 
into difficulties by an anxiety to protect against breaches of trust (BPP 1829 p. 235).” This 
anxiety meant that “in order to prevent fraud, courts have borne too hard upon trustees, and 
thereby prevented proper persons from accepting trusts who would otherwise have done [so] 
(BPP 1829 p. 235).” The predisposition towards protecting the beneficiaries of trusts often 
prevented trustees from taking actions that maximized the value of the assets under their   16
supervision. For example, trustees who sold land to raise cash for beneficiaries (for purposes 
stipulated in a settlement) could not purchase the property if they believed it was selling for too 
low a price. The predisposition could also lead to the punishment of trustees who exceeded their 
authority to invest funds in projects that paid high. The King’s Counsel emphasized this point by 
describing an often mentioned case from Chancery court in which a trustee lent money on West 
Indian mortgages and earned his charges “a very large sum on the whole by this management of 
the property,” but on one transaction, lost money when the mortgagee failed. The beneficiaries 
sued. When deciding the case, Chancellor Lord Tharlow wrote “he was extremely sorry to 
charge the trustees with the loss, but he felt bound to do it (BPP 1829 p. 235).” 
 Now, consider the position of an entrepreneur hoping to strike a deal for the purchase of 
land locked in a settled estate that the life tenant lacked the power to sell. What were the 
entrepreneur’s options? The entrepreneur could wait for the family to resettle the estate. Then, 
the family could add the necessary powers to the document. The wait might last for years, 
depending on the length of time a tenant in tail who was born after the writing of the current 
settlement took to reach the age of adulthood. 
  The other option was to strike a bargain that all of the parties to the settlement would 
adhere to voluntarily until either (a) the family could rewrite the settlement and/or (b) until the 
entrepreneur possessed the land long enough for the title to be secure against claims of adverse 
possession. Enforcing such a bargain might be difficult, for several reasons. First, transactions 
such as this were seldom repeated, and certainly not repeated the infinite or indefinite number of 
times needed to sustain cooperation via trigger strategies (a typical way in which self-enforcing 
agreements arise). Second, adherence to the bargain depended only in part on the parties’ 
economic interests and also on personal relations. Extended families could be complicated   17
emotional arenas, where jealousy, desire, love, hope, hate, antipathy, and revenge might motivate 
individuals to take unexpected, and at times, economically irrational actions. Entrepreneurs’ 
must have been reluctant to sink large sums into projects which might be halted when siblings 
fought, or children rebelled, or distant cousins fell in or out of love. Third, parties who wanted to 
defect from the agreement could do so at low financial cost, because equity and common law 
courts gave them quick and inexpensive mechanisms to assert their rights against parties that 
illegally held land or violated covenants of trust. Fourth, the entrepreneur faced problems of 
fraud from the family, which might promise to provide him with certain lands at a certain price, 
but which could back out of the deal or hold him up for larger sums after he had sunk significant 
investments, perhaps by ex-ante establishing exit strategies of which the entrepreneur was not 
aware. One possibility would be to create ‘pocket conveyances,’ which transferred property to 
other parties, prior to selling or leasing the land to the entrepreneur. Other possibility would be to 
conceal a family member’s interest in the settlement, perhaps by failing to provide a clause of the 
document, or insisting that someone with a beneficial interest had migrated abroad or fallen out 
of contact with the family or was believed to be deceased. Then, the family could renege on the 
deal by ‘rediscovering’ the overlooked clause or ‘resurrecting’ the supposedly departed relative. 
  In theory, a life tenant hoping to sell settled land to an entrepreneur had one additional 
option. He could sue in Chancery, hoping to convince the court that its rules, precedents, and 
principles should allow him to sell the land. Chancery’s presumption was to protect beneficiaries 
and to prohibit transactions not authorized in the original settlement, but the life tenant could 
argue that his family’s settlement contained either ambiguous clauses that, in fact, authorized the 
sale or implicit powers that, in the past, had been exercised to enable similar sales. Such suits   18
were not unknown, but they were uncommon, and by the early eighteenth century, increasingly 
rare. 
  Life tenants avoided Chancery because of the court’s practical defects. By 1700, “the 
word, ‘Chancery,’ had become synonymous with expense, delay, and despair (Baker 1971 p. 
128).” During the eighteenth century, scholars estimate Chancery’s backlog at something like 
10,000 to 20,000 cases, with the time needed to dispose of them as long as thirty years (Baker 
1971 p. 129). One source of these problems was the principle that ultimate responsibility for 
everything done in the court rested on the chancellor’s shoulders. Most chancellors wished to 
reach decisions only after all relevant facts were ascertained, and this required time and effort. 
Chancellors often commissioned enquiries into facts and adjourned trials until they received 
reports. Chancellors might require extensive investigations before deciding straightforward 
issues, even if all parties to the suit agreed on the pertinent questions and relevant facts. For 
example, in his testimony before the Royal Commission, the King’s Counsel, John Bell, 
described the case of Leak v. Robinson, where both parties wanted the Chancellor to decide 
“whether certain limitations were not too remote,” and neither party wanted to incur the expense 
of  “a taking of accounts,” but the court refused to settle the question expeditiously, and the case 
“remained for many years in the court of Chancery, and put the parties to a very great expense in 
taking accounts (BPP 1829 p. 243).” 
A second source of expense and delay was the dependence of Chancery officials on the 
fee system. Most of the hundreds of clerks were paid for each task they performed. The clerks 
were paid by the page for drafting documents, so they developed “such large handwriting, and 
used such wide margins, that it was said a skillful clerk could spread six ordinary pages into forty 
(Baker 1971 p. 130).” Litigants were obliged to order and pay for copies they did not want and   19
which were sometimes never made. Proceedings became verbose and complex. The paperwork 
involved often inhibited the progress of suits. Since every step in litigation imposed fees, there 
was neither incentive for swiftness nor procedural reform. “Many of the fees were extortionate 
… and standards for taking them were somewhat flexible (Baker 1971 p. 129).” While two 
distinguished chancellors, Francis Bacon and Lord Macclesfield, were dismissed for accepting 
‘presents’ for favoring one side in a suit, their subordinates regularly received ‘gifts’ for 
expediting paperwork, which clerks came to see as fees which could be demanded with an 
untroubled conscience. Positions as a chancery clerks became so valuable that in the early 1700s, 
they could be sold for thousands of pounds. Clerkships came to be seen as property. Attempts to 
reform the system were resisted with hostility.
8 
  A third source of expense and delay was uncertainty concerning and ambiguity within 
Chancery’s legal doctrines. This complaint arose often in testimony before the Royal 
Commission. Barrister Charles Butler, for example, stated that much litigation arose due to 
confusion about what the court of equity considered an abuse of power. Litigation to determine 
what was or was not an abuse was expensive. Animosity within families, however, often 
compelled family members to sue, in the hope that they would win their case, or at least impose 
large costs on their rivals (BPP 1829 p. 116). 
 
4. Case Studies 
This section presents concise case studies that illustrate problems posed by the system of 
strict settlements. These case studies come from the Journals of the House of Commons and 
testimony provided to the First Report of the Royal Commission on Real Property.  
                                                 
8   For an extended discussion of the problems of the later Chancery court, see Baker (1971) pp. 126-131   20
The first case illustrates ways in which strict settlements, limited powers, and long lives 
could keep landholders from putting resources to productive uses. To the Royal Commission, a 
barrister, Hasler Capron, described a case involving a client. The client inherited an estate in 
1762 at the age of eleven. He had been alive at the time of the settlement, and was bound by its 
provisions, which lacked explicit powers to harvest timber. In 1829, when Capron’s testimony 
was taken, the client had been bound by the settlement for 67 years.  
Not a stick has been cut during the whole of that period; all the old trees, with 
scarcely an exception, have become decayed and valueless; no young timber is 
rising to replace them, and no underwood has been produced (BPP 1829 p. 173).  
 
Capron testified that “it was thought right, many years since, to make an application to the then 
Lord Chancellor on the subject, who declined interfering, and his example was followed by one 
of his successors at a later period (BPP 1829 p. 173).”  
A second case study illustrates how settlements could remain in force for longer periods 
and how the property could pass unexpectedly to remote relatives. This case involves the estates 
of the Duke of Northumberland. In 1767, the first Duke of Northumberland settled his estates on 
his eldest son for life and upon that son’s son in tail. The first Duke had another son who was set 
to inherit in the event of the death of the eldest or the exhaustion of his direct line. In 1786, the 
eldest son succeeded his father as the second Duke of Northumberland and inherited the estate. 
The second Duke had a son who was the tenant in tail in the 1767 settlement and another son 
who was to inherit in the event of the eldest son’s death or the exhaustion of his direct line.  
When the eldest son married in 1817, he joined with the second Duke in resettling the estate. The 
settlement limited the life tenant’s power to sell or lease land. In 1818, the eldest son succeeded 
his father as the third Duke and inherited the estate as a life tenant. The third Duke died without 
an issue and the estate passed to his brother who succeeded as the fourth Duke. In 1865, the   21
fourth Duke also died without issue. His death exhausted the line of the eldest son of the first 
Duke so the estate passed to the senior heir in the line of the second son of the first Duke, the 
Earl of Beverley. The Earl had been alive when the Second Duke’s estate was resettled in 1817. 
The Earl’s eldest son had also been alive. The Earl inherited the Northumberland estates and 
became the fifth Duke of Northumberland. Since he had been alive at the date of resettlement, he 
was bound by its terms. Two years later, he died, and his eldest son succeeded him as the sixth 
Duke. Since he had been alive at the date of resettlement, even though he was just an infant, he 
was bound by its terms. When he inherited, his son became tenant in tail. Since his son was born 
after 1817 (and thus after the date of the resettlement) and before 1846 (and thus was over the 
age of twenty-one), the sixth Duke and his heir apparent could, employ the process of common 
recovery to break the entail and resettle the estate. Thus, the 1817 settlement with its restrictive 
powers lasted 50 years. Over this period, the life tenant changed six times, ultimately residing 
with the second Duke’s cousin’s grandson. A priori, it would have been impossible to predict 
this line of descent or to know the personalities, capabilities, and powers appropriate for each life 
tenant.       
  The vagaries of descent generated anxiety about the relationship between an estate’s life 
tenant and the estate’s other beneficiaries. A lacuna in the male line might shift control of the 
estate to distant relatives, who might lack emotional (and perhaps legal) ties to those who 
remained dependent on the estate, such as the previous life tenant’s widows and daughters. In 
such circumstances, a life tenant might shortchange beneficiaries to whom he lacked close 
emotional ties (or perhaps had long-standing animosities). Fears of abuse increased when 
prospective heirs were born after the date of the settlement, in which case they could inherit the 
estate in fee simple, and have legal obligations neither to current beneficiaries nor the extended   22
family. Circumstances of this sort play prominent roles in novels of the period. Jane Austen’s 
“Pride and Prejudice” is an example. Complaints about abusive heirs also appear in legal 
literature. To the Royal Commission, for example, the leading barrister John Tyrrell testified that 
concerns about abusive heirs shaped the structure of settlements, particularly restraints on the 
power of alienation by a life tenant, because the life tenant might be a stranger with no interest in 
the family. John Tyrrell described “several cruel cases” with which he had personal experience 
(BPP pp. 321-3). 
  Settlements also contributed to anxieties about the security of conveyance. As the 
previous section noted, entrepreneurs purchasing land from settled estates had to worry about the 
strength of their titles. A case dealing with the sale of land near the River Rodon illustrates the 
problem. In a petition submitted to the House of Commons, Joseph Goodman described how he 
signed a deed of covenant with several land-owners near the river that 
“would permit him to come upon their lands for the clearing the said River in 
order to make it navigable and for removing any impediments therein; and such of 
the said land owners as had an inheritance in fee-simple did give power to the said 
petitioner to dig down or cut away any part of the lands belonging to them, not 
exceeding 30 feet in breadth, in order to enlarge the said River for the more easy 
making the same navigable; and the said petitioner covenanted to make 
satisfaction to the land owners for what damage should accrue thereby to be 
ascertained in manner therein mentioned.”
9 
 
Goodman began to improve the river and had come close to completing the project when he 
learned that the deed would be voided because “several estates and interests, in all or greatest 
part of the said lands, being limited to persons not in being, or to infants or coverts, or under 
some entail or settlement” could not be conveyed to him. A witness stated “that several of the 
persons, who signed the aforesaid Deed were only tenants for life; and could not agree that the 
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said Joseph Goodman should have the banks of the river so cut.” Goodman lost his rights to the 
river and the money that he had invested in the project.   
Another example of insecure conveyancing comes from barrister John Gurney’s 
testimony to the Royal Commission on Real Property. Gurney described a case where a 
gentleman sold an estate claiming that he held it in fee simple. The purchaser built a “good 
house” on the lands and lived on the property for forty years. Then, a daughter of the gentlemen 
who sold the property discovered a deed of settlement made many years prior upon her parent’s 
marriage. The settlement did not provide powers to sell portions of the estate. The daughter 
brought the case to court and “recovered the estate (BPP 1829 p. 97).”  The purchaser lost his 
home, the land, and the money that he invested in the property. 
 
5. Estate Acts and the Relaxation of Strict Settlements 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Parliament could remedy almost any 
difficulty arising from the system of strict settlements. Prior to the rise of strict settlements, 
Parliament occasionally resolved disputes over landholding, sometimes in response to petitions 
from the public, but usually in response to petitions from the royal household, which requested 
changes in rights to royal estates, often in order to reward tenures and pensions to people who 
had served the regime well. After the rise of strict settlements, the mechanisms previously 
employed to manage royal estates became mechanisms for managing strictly-settled estates of 
landlords large and small. This section describes those mechanisms, which we refer to as estate 
acts, and the ways in which parties to settlements used estate acts to restructure rights and 
convey property.
10 
                                                 
10   See Bogart and Richardson (2008) or additional details concerning estate acts, including in-depth discussions of 
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Estate acts began as petitions from landholders seeking relief from restrictions that strict 
settlements imposed on the employment of land and resources. Over time, Parliament 
standardized procedures for processing petitions. Typically, petitions were submitted to the 
House of Lords, introduced as estate bills, and referred to a committee, which ensured that the 
requests met certain requirements designed to protect the rights of interested parties. Notice of a 
bill had to be sent to all parties with interests in the property. Notification requirements included 
all individuals with rights to the land via deed, marriage, custom, or settlement. These 
individuals had the right to tell the committee their concerns about the legislation. Bills deemed 
beneficial to the pertinent parties were publicly read three times, sent through committees in both 
houses, passed by the Lords and the Commons, and sent for royal assent. 
This multilayered process provided individuals with an opportunity to describe the ways 
in which the legislation could harm their interests and enabled Parliament to ensure that these 
parties received compensation. The process also meant that estate bills represented joint 
decisions of the national legislature (Parliament), the executive branch (the monarch and his 
ministers) and the courts of final appeal (the monarch, the chancellor, and Parliament). 
Parliament kept written records of the proceedings and served as a repository where information 
about estate acts could be examined by the public. Parliament provided copies of these 
documents to parties which requested them, enabling parties to use Parliament as a means of 
documenting transactions. 
Estate acts served several functions. Estate acts’ primary task was authorizing 
transactions prohibited by strict settlements. Table 1 indicates the most common kinds of 
transactions. The typical act authorizing a sale indicated what specific piece of land could be sold 
and what property the life tenant would return to the estate to ensure that all beneficiaries   25
received at least the same support as before. The typical act authorizing exchange of property 
indicated what property would be transferred out of an estate and what property would replace it. 
Acts authorizing leases specified the property that could be leased, the terms under which it 
could be let, and the length of the leases. Acts authorizing a discharge released property from a 
settlement and specified land that would enter the settlement in return. A mortgage act permitted 
a life tenant to borrow money using land as collateral. If the borrower defaulted, the act might 
empower the lender to take ownership of the collateral or might provide the lender with rights to 
use (or lease) the collateral until he recovered what he was owed. An act of partition divided a 
unit of land into two or more units. Life tenants might use these acts to divide property amongst 
members of the extend family, perhaps by subdividing a large lot containing a single house into 
several lots on which family members built separate dwellings. Life tenants might also use these 
acts to subdivide property in preparation for improving the land and selling it at a later date. All 
of these acts helped landholders convey property to other parties and put resources to new and 
better uses.  
Acts concerning timber and mining also affected the employment of resources. Acts 
authorizing the cutting and sale of timber allowed life tenants to harvest trees from their estates. 
Timber was an important commodity at the time. Old-growth timber was a principal input for 
naval construction. Tall, straight trees were needed to make the masts and keels of ships. Timber 
was also used to construct homes, farms, and workshops and for manufacture of durable 
merchandise, such as furniture, tools, and wagons. Wood served as a source of fuel. Timbers’ 
value made managing woodlands an important task for landed families. Determining the optimal 
mix of trees and the optimal time to harvest took knowledge, skill, and patience. As trees grew, 
their value increased. Once trees attained full height, and the wood began to age, trees value   26
began to decline. Trees’ growth/value profile, the financial needs of the family, interests rates, 
and other economic conditions (such as the demand for lumber) determined the point of 
maximum profit. All of these conditions could not be incorporated into settlement contracts. 
Estate acts allowed families to harvest timber at the point of maximum profit, which was 
difficult, if not impossible to do, when settlements restricted life tenants’ and trustees’ powers. 
Acts authorizing the mining of ore allowed families to sell minerals and coal discovered 
on their estates. The value of metals – such as iron and tin – grew throughout the eighteenth 
century, as technological progress lowered the cost of smelting, increased the quality of metals, 
and expanded the range of products which could be made with pewter and steel. The value of 
coal also increased, as demand for fuel rose, and the availability of alternatives (particularly 
wood) declined. Estate acts allowed families to open new mines or lease the rights to mine coal 
on their estates (mining leases typically lasted 40 to 60 years). Settlements seldom included such 
powers, because of the difficulty writing a contract specifying the conditions under which one 
would want to take such action.  
In addition to authorizing actions prohibited by settlements, estate acts served as a 
mechanism for completing incomplete settlement contracts. Settlements could not possibly 
consider all possible contingencies that could arise during their long and variable existence, 
particularly during an era of revolutionary economic and technological progress unanticipated by 
the original writers’ of the documents. The settlement system dealt with incompleteness in 
several ways. The doctrine of perpetuities forced settlements to be reinstituted periodically, 
allowing families to rewrite the agreement and reorganize the allocation of resources when they 
prepared to pass the land to a tenant in tail born after the date of the settlement. Chancery courts 
created default rules which came into force when circumstances arose not covered by the   27
settlement. Chancery itself could be approached when the default rules or the settlement itself 
generated unpalatable outcomes. But, as the previous section showed, Chancery’s default 
position depended upon doctrines of equity, which protected beneficial interests and the desires 
of the deceased (i.e. those who settled the land on their descendants). In addition, Chancery’s 
sclerotic procedures raised the cost and slowed the dispensation of justice.  
Estate acts provided an alternative route for dealing with incomplete contracts. This route 
differed from the law of equity in important ways. Parliament streamlined procedures for 
requesting reviews, providing a relatively rapid and inexpensive forum for dealing with 
contingencies. Parliament employed default rules that emphasized the productive employment of 
resources as long as beneficial interests received sufficient compensation. Parliament’s doctrines, 
in other words, looked forward, emphasizing the interests of current and future generations. 
Parliament’s doctrines deemphasized the dictates of deceased landholders, except for the 
beneficial interests which Parliament satisfied but did not emphasize. 
Estate acts also served as a mechanism for revealing information pertinent to property. 
Entrepreneurs seeking to acquire rights to resources worried about the provenance of the land 
that they sought to purchase. Equitable rights to the land were private information. Real rights to 
land were, in some cases, public information and, in other cases, private. Public repositories did 
not retain records indicating who had which rights or where such information might reside.
11 
Sellers had an incentive to withhold enough private information to derail deals that they wished 
to unwind. Ex-post revelation of private information occasionally cost entrepreneurs substantial 
                                                 
11   Here we should note that England did not possess a system of notaries like nations on the continent. The public 
records to land that existed tended to be those retained within the rolls of courts and the royal bureaucracy. 
Locating and searching such records was an expensive and time-consuming process. The only exceptions were 
the deed registries in Middlesex and Yorkshire.    28
sums. Fears of such situations must have deterred entrepreneurs from undertaking many potential 
projects. 
Parliament’s procedures for processing bills required the notification of all parties with 
interests in the property. Parliament recorded all of the information that it received, including a 
verbatim copy of the settlement agreement and all rights regarding the land. Parliament 
encapsulated this information within an estate act, and then, established new rules regarding the 
land. Parliamentary scribes recorded all of this information in a series of documents. These 
documents could be used as evidence in a court of law. That fact was the essence of a private act. 
These acts created definitive documentation regarding personal and property rights. Private 
parties had to bring these documents to court to enforce these rights. Private parties obtained 
these documents from the Parliamentary record office, which could be searched by the public. 
The legal nature of Parliamentary decisions and the creation of legal documentation 
meant that rights to land and resources could be conveyed securely via estate acts. Estate acts 
described all relevant information. Estate acts encoded this information in documents that courts 
recognized as the last word on the subject. Estate acts placed this information in the public 
record. Entrepreneurs that purchased or leased land via an estate act need not worry that courts 
would reverse the transaction at some point in the future. 
Not only did the Parliamentary process differ from the Chancery process because the 
former emphasized efficiency while the later emphasized equity, the Parliamentary process was 
quicker, cheaper, and more predictable than suits in the Chancery Court (English and Saville, 
1983, p. 50). The success rate for private bill initiatives in Parliament was very high, particularly 
after the early 1700s (Hoppit 1996). The process usually took a matter of weeks, whereas in the 
Chancery the process could take years owing to the large backlog of cases (Baker 1971, pp. 128-  29
133). Evidence on the fees for many types of private bills are available in a report from the 
Select Committee on House of Commons Officers and Fees. The report shows that fees paid to 
clerks for estate bills in 1832 were minimal, amounting to an average of £28 for bills affecting 
one person and an average of £70 for bills affecting several persons or having more than one 
object (BPP 1833 p. 247). The report also provides information on the total fees paid to solicitors 
for one estate bill in 1831. The total cost including fees for the Lords was £534 (BPP 1833 p. 
250). It is revealing this solicitor’s fee was similar to those for enclosure, road, railway, and 
urban improvement bills in the 1820s. Among the 19 enclosure, road, railway, and urban 
improvement bills described in the report the average solicitors fee was £526. Thus is does not 
appear that estate bills were any more expensive than the average local or private bill.  
The evidence on Chancery suits suggests that fees could be larger. Baker chronicles the 
case of Morgan v. Lord Claredon in 1808 where the fees exceeded £3700 and the case lasted 
more than 16 years before the counsels were briefed (Baker 1971 p. 131). We are not aware of 
any comparable cases from the same period where the expense of an estate bill reached such 
proportions and with similar delays. 
A case study illustrates how estate acts helped life tenants manage their property and 
facilitated the conveyance of land (see English and Saville 1983, pp. 54-58, for additional 
details). The Coke family of Norfolk obtained five estate acts over a 150-year period. In 1665, 
John Coke settled his estates on relatives in succession and in tail male; reserving for himself 
powers to make leases. In 1671, John Coke died without children. His cousin, Robert Coke, 
succeeded as life tenant to the estate. Ambiguities in the settlement obscured the heir’s power to 
make leases. So in 1678, Robert Coke obtained an estate act empowering him to make leases of 
the estates. In 1718, Robert resettled the estate when his son reached the age of majority. In   30
1747, Robert’s grandson, Thomas Coke, resettled the estate when his son, Edward Coke (i.e. 
Robert’s grandson), reached the age of majority. At that time, shares of the income from 64 of 
the 83 properties in the Coke estates were reserved for financing beneficial interests, such as 
bride’s pin money, jointures for wives and widows, and portions for children, grandchildren, and 
relatives. The Coke family wished to charge all the sums to the same lands, so that they could 
freely use the rest of the property. An estate act facilitated this rationalization of the family’s 
assets. In 1753, Edward Coke died, leaving Thomas Coke with no surviving sons. In 1759, to 
protect the interests of his female descendants, Thomas Coke, inserted in the settlement 
additional restrictive covenants. In 1776, Thomas Coke passed away, and his nephew Thomas 
William Coke inherited. He survived for 66 years, and during that period, obtained three estate 
acts that authorized him to sell lands as long as he replaced them with new property of equivalent 
value dedicated to the same uses. 
Another case study illustrates how estate acts enabled landholders to respond to 
opportunities created by London’s real-estate boom during the 1720s. London sits within 
Middlesex County, which operated a registry recording real-estate transactions since the 
eighteenth century. From 1715 to 1719, the number of deeds registered annually averaged 1552. 
From 1720 to 1724, the number of deeds registered annually averaged 2395 (Sheppard, Belcher, 
and Cottrell 1979). The real-estate boom generated opportunities to profit from the construction 
of housing and factories. The Duke of Norfolk held estates in the city and on its outskirts, but the 
settlement under which he held his lands prohibited the extension of leases beyond his life. In 
1724, the Duke of Norfolk overcame this constraint by obtaining an act that allowed him to 
extend leases for up to sixty years. In 1725, the Duke registered a 42-year building lease for his   31
lands in London. The Duke’s deed specifically mentioned the passage of the act giving him the 
legal authority to enter into long-term lease contracts.
12  
A final case study illustrates how estate acts increased the security of conveyance. To the 
Royal Commission, the barrister, Alexander Sidebottom, described a case where buyers wished 
to purchase land from eight different manors. However, on these manors, enclosures and 
allotments had been made without distinguishing whether tracts of land were held in copyhold or 
freehold, resulting in confusion concerning the provenance of titles. It was suggested that the 
lords of the manors could stipulate that a certain percentage of the land should be considered 
copyhold of each manor. Such stipulations could help to determine the average value of the land 
(and thus the purchase price), but such stipulations would leave the purchaser vulnerable to 
future suits to recover plots of land conveyed incorrectly. Transferring titles securely required 
following correct procedures. Therefore, the buyers and sellers asked Parliament to authorize a 
commission that would determine what was freehold and what was copyhold. The commission’s 
decisions formed the foundation of the estate act. The act converted the commission’s decisions 
into facts of law, providing the buyers and sellers with the documents necessary to convey title 
securely. Sidebottom stated that estate acts were the only way to get out of such difficult 
situations (BPP 1829 pp. 272-73).  
 
6. Urbanization and Estate Acts 
Our hypothesis suggests that there should have been a correlation between estate acts and 
economic development. This section shows that such a correlation existed during the decades 
surrounding the Industrial Revolution. We focus on urbanization, a key component of 
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development, and a phenomenon which we can measure accurately, using data on population 
densities.
13 
Figure 1 (a) illustrates urbanization across English counties between 1760 and 1830. The 
light-shading indicates counties where during that period the population per square mile 
increased more than 15%. The medium-shading indicates counties where during that period the 
population per square mile increased more than 20%. The black-shading indicates that the 
population density of the county of Middlesex increased by more than 400%. The growth of 
population in Middlesex stems from the growth of London. Growth of population in the 
Midlands stems from the rise of industries, such as textiles, manufacturing, and mining, and the 
ensuing expansion of industrial urban areas. In the Midlands, the county that experienced the 
most growth was Lancashire. Its population grew by more than 1 million, with much of the 
growth concentrated in the cities of Manchester and Liverpool. 
Figure 1 (b) through (d) reveal that between 1760 and 1830, estate acts were concentrated 
in industrializing urban areas. Figure 1 (b) illustrates the number of acts authorizing sales of 
settled land that Parliament passed between 1760 and 1830. The light-shading indicates counties 
with more than one and a half estate acts per 100 square miles. The medium-shading indicates 
counties with more than three estate acts per 100 square miles. The black-shading indicates that 
Middlesex had more than 20 acts per 100 square miles. Figure 1 (c) illustrates the number of 
estate acts authorizing leases per 100 square miles. The light-shading indicates counties with 
more than one-tenth of an act per 100 square miles. The black-shading indicates that Middlesex 
had more than 20 acts per 100 square miles. Figure 1 (d) illustrates the number of estate acts 
authorizing mortgages per 100 square miles. The light-shading indicates counties with more than 
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one act per 1000 square miles. The black-shading indicates that Middlesex had more than 10 acts 
per 1000 square miles. 
The correlation between estate acts and population growth can be seen clearly when the 
data are plotted on a graph. Figure 2 accomplishes this exercise. The figure plots the county-level 
change in population from 1760 to 1830 against the number of estate acts authorizing sales and 
leases in each county over the same period. Higher changes in population are strongly associated 
with larger numbers of sale and lease acts. The correlation coefficient is 0.82. 
The geographic correlation between urbanization and estate acts provides one piece of 
evidence that estate acts promoted greater efficiency. The restrictions associated with strict 
settlements should have become more binding as urbanization increased and as landowners on 
the periphery of urban expansion perceived the opportunity to profit by switching land from rural 
to urban uses. Without estate acts, it would have been much more difficult for landowners to 
reallocate resources in response to urbanization. At the same time, by relaxing the constraints on 
building in a particular city, estate acts made that city more attractive to business and individuals. 
Many estate acts were specifically passed to authorize building leases in urban areas. For 
instance, there was a cluster of building lease acts in Lancashire in the 1790s, when Manchester 
and Liverpool were growing rapidly. Estate acts and urbanization were clearly interconnected.  
 
7. Conclusion 
In this essay, we have argued that by removing the shackles of the past, reducing 
transaction costs, restructuring equitable and real estates, reallocating resources to new uses, and 
increasing the security of conveyance, estate acts made property more productive. Our argument 
addresses a large literature concerning property rights and economic progress. A well-known 
hypothesis is that British courts developed a common law that protected property and promoted   34
efficiency better than the legal codes of other nations. The reward for adopting such judge-made 
laws was rapid economic development (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998).  
This paper argues that Britain did not have an inherently superior property-rights system 
circa 1700.  Like many European countries, an array of courts enforced an array of rights in an 
array of ways. These overlapping legal systems tied land to traditional uses. One key to Britain’s 
economic success was its ability to adapt property rights in a manner which reduced transaction 
costs and reallocated land and resources to higher-value uses. Parliament played a key role in this 
process, by establishing a forum where families and individuals could reorganize rights to 
equitable and real estates outside of the existing judicial process. This Parliamentary forum made 
property rights increasingly adaptable. At the end of the seventeenth century, most families had 
locked land into strict settlements that minimized the risk of opportunistic behavior, but in doing 
so, restricted the uses to which land could be put. Those restrictions could be costly if economic 
conditions changed, which they did during the eighteenth century. Parliamentary estate acts 
enabled landowners to react to the rapid pace of economic progress. Eventually, during a time 
period which falls outside the bounds of this study, Parliament passed general reforms of the 
equitable and real property systems, creating the common-law of property that scholars admire 
today. The efficiency of the English common law, in sum, was in part due to Parliamentary 
intervention, and not an inevitable outcome of judge-made laws. 
In future research, we plan to explore the relationship between the legislative and judicial 
processes for creating legal codes. We also plan to identify the casual links between adaptable 
institutions and economic development as well as the political mechanisms that fostered 
adaptability. A final topic that we plan to examine is the issue of redistribution. Our transaction-
cost analysis does not preclude the possibility that estate acts redistributed income. Our   35
examination of the evidence indicates, however, that redistribution was (at most) a second order 
issue. Contemporary commentators incessantly discussed issues of efficiency, but seldom 
(almost never) discussed issues of redistribution. The reason, we believe, lies in Parliament’s 
efforts to ensure that estate acts resulted in Pareto-superior reorganizations of rights. The hows 
and whys of Pareto-superiority are worthy of further research.    36
Table 1: Transactions Authorized by Estate Acts, 1660 to 1830 





Property sale  1814 51.5
Property lease  538 15.3
Property exchange  273 7.8
 
Discharge/settle property  192 5.5
Mortgage of property  132 3.7
Partition of property  92 2.6
 
Cutting and/or sale of timber  60 1.7
Mining ore (usually coal)  44 1.3
 
 
Source: Database of Acts of Parliament, See Bogart and Richardson (2008b) for details. 
Notes: The percentages in column 2 do not add to 100 because there were some estate acts that 
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Figure 1: Geographic Distribution of Estate Acts, 1760 to 1830 
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Source: Database of Acts of Parliament, See Bogart and Richardson (2008b) for details   39
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